This paper explores the ambiguous nature of the EU’s relationship to international order (defined as the actually existing correlation of material power, institutions and ‘reigning ideas’), and places it within the framework of recent scholarship on the EU’s international relations and international roles. It begins by addressing the EU’s international relations, drawing attention to three aspects: the EU is simultaneously a (sub)system of international relations, part of the broader process of international relations and a ‘power’ in international relations. The argument then turns to the EU’s international role(s), identifying issues relating to role conceptions, role performance and role impact. These ideas are then explored and illustrated by reference to three levels of the EU’s engagement with international order: the ‘EU order’, the EU in the European order and the EU in the global order.

The paper argues that in respect of the first of these (the ‘EU order’), the stalling of EU reform symbolised by the rejection of the Constitutional treaty raises major questions about the EU’s capacity to ‘export’ its values and institutions and to mobilise resources for collective action. In respect of the second (the EU in the European order), the EU has ‘internalised’ major parts of the broader European order, and this raises questions about its exercise of structural power within the European arena and the ‘neighbourhood’. In respect of the third (the EU in the global order), the EU is increasingly encountering the costs and risks associated with the conduct of a ‘real’ foreign policy, and this will constitute a key constraining element in its approach to problems of global order for the foreseeable future. These conclusions underline the ambiguity of the EU’s relationship to international order, but also point to important areas of variation, differentiation and linkage in the practices of ‘EUropean foreign policy’.

I. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, there has understandably been a significant and often intense focus on the EU’s role in the emerging international (dis)order. Beginning in the early 1990s if not before, there has been attention to the ways in which the EU in itself expresses relevant principles or practices of order, and to the ways in which the EU might contribute to the enhancement of international order (Smith 1993, 2000, Story 1993, Keohane
and Hoffmann 1993, Niblett and Wallace 2001, Maull 2005). This concern is reflective of two underlying assumptions. The first is that international order – in the sense of an orderly world – is good for the EU, because it serves important commercial, diplomatic and other purposes of the Union. The second is that the EU is good for international order – in other words, that the strengthening of the EU, and particularly of its international activities, is a significant contribution to the emergence of a ‘civilised’ world arena. These linked assumptions have been at the centre of much study of the EU and its relationship on the one hand to the ‘new Europe’ and on the other hand to the broader global arena. They take expression both in empirical work aimed at exploring the EU’s international activities, and in normative positions explored both within the academic and the policy realms.

These two assumptions, though, are only rarely questioned, and it is the purpose of this paper to suggest some of the ways in which they might be both questioned and questionable. To assert that ‘international order is good for the EU, and the EU is good for international order’ may sound self-evident, but the paper takes this as a problem to be explored and understood rather than as a given of the EU’s international relations. The problem, it will be argued, is inseparable from the ambiguities that characterise the international relations of the EU, and which create uncertainties about its appropriate international role(s). In turn, these ambiguities and uncertainties create tensions between different but coexisting elements of the EU’s international activities, and can thus be seen as problematical not only in terms of the EU itself but also in terms of broader world order considerations. It will further be argued that the current conjuncture in the EU’s international relations is such as to exacerbate these tensions, and that both policy and analysis should take them into consideration.

The paper begins by exploring the international relations of the EU, bringing to bear ideas recently developed by the author and by Christopher Hill (Hill and Smith 2005) and also linking these to issues of the EU’s international role(s) (Elgström and Smith 2006). It also introduces a working definition of international order, which can act as a guide to the analysis of the EU’s position, actions and roles. The paper goes on to explore these ideas by reference to three levels of the EU’s engagement with international order: the
‘EU international order’, the EU in the European order, and the EU in the global order. The paper argues that in respect of the first of these (the ‘EU international order’), the stalling of EU reform symbolised by the rejection of the Constitutional treaty raises major questions about the EU’s capacity to ‘export’ its values and institutions and to mobilise resources for collective action. In respect of the second (the EU in the European order), the EU has ‘internalised’ major parts of the broader European order, and this raises questions about its exercise of structural power within the European arena and the ‘neighbourhood’. In respect of the third (the EU in the global order), the EU is increasingly encountering the costs and risks associated with the conduct of a ‘real’ foreign policy, and this will constitute a key constraining element in its approach to problems of global order for the foreseeable future. These conclusions underline the ambiguity of the EU’s relationship to international order, but also point to important areas of variation, differentiation and linkage in the practice of ‘EUropean foreign policy’.

In undertaking this exploration, the paper focuses predominantly on the political, diplomatic and security domains. Whilst the EU’s role in the European or the global political economy is highly significant and consequential, it will only be mentioned here insofar as it enables us to think more clearly about the nature of international order and the EU’s role(s) in it. Other current work by the present author focuses on those areas (for example Smith 2005) and will eventually be linked to this area of enquiry.

II. Conceptualising the EU’s International Relations and International Roles

As noted above, recent work by Christopher Hill and the present author has focused on three dimensions of the EU’s international relations. Uniquely, the EU is first a (sub)system of international relations in itself, second a major element in the general processes of international relations, and finally an embryonic ‘power’ in the international arena (Hill and Smith 2005: Introduction). What are the implications of this position for the EU’s approach to international order? At the same time, in other work, attention has been focused on the ways in which the EU’s international role(s) can be evaluated.
In this part of the paper, these two areas of analytical interest will be explored and then related to the general issue of international order.

(i) The EU as a (sub)system of International Relations
One way of conceptualising the international relations of the EU is to view it as a specific subsystem of international relations, and one which has developed its own characteristic structures, institutions and norms. Although this (sub)system is densely institutionalised, and the international activities of the Member States are strongly conditioned by their mutual entanglements, this remains nonetheless an international system, in which agency resides with the constituent parts for the main, and in which they retain claims to sovereignty and autonomy. The processes by which Member State policies are coordinated and through which they mutually condition each other remain recognisably those of international relations rather than those of ‘domestic’ politics. They are increasingly ‘Europeanised’ and respond to norms generated by interactions within the system through processes of social learning, but issues of power, institutions and ideas are not decided purely by processes that might be described as integrative – they are penetrated by the broader international processes of which the EU is part and they are permeated by strong residual claims to freedom of action particularly by the larger Member States.

(ii) The EU as Part of the General Process of International Relations
A second way of conceptualising the international relations of the EU is as part of the broader processes that characterise the international arena. The Union has become increasingly active across an increasingly broad spectrum of international issues; it is one of the key participants in both economic and political processes and (increasingly) in security processes; and it constitutes a factor in the policy-making of a very wide range of international actors. But this participation in international processes is not unconditional: it raises significant questions about the ways in which EU actions are legitimised and about the ways in which those who participate in the EU’s name are accountable. Not only this, but it raises questions about the capacity of the EU to extract resources from either its Member States or other international
contexts, and mobilise them in such a way as to make a difference to international outcomes. This is important, because much is made in the study and practice of the EU's international relations of the ways in which the ‘EU process’ shapes distinctive types of international actions and international outcomes: the focus on ‘civilian’ and ‘soft’ power resources, and the emphasis on processes of negotiation and communication rather than on processes of coercion, is seen as giving the EU a comparative advantage in approaching a wide range of international issues. Importantly, this comparative advantage is rooted in the interaction between the EU as a subsystem of international relations and the demands and opportunities afforded by participation in the more general processes of IR. Further, the tendency of the EU to seek out partnerships, to export both institutional forms and to structure its international relations in a highly differentiated form is a growing feature of the broad processes of international relations in the twenty-first century (JEPP Special Issue; Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger, 2005; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004).

(iii) The EU as a ‘power’ in International Relations
The third key element of the EU's international relations is its ability on its own account to structure the international milieu and the institutions that characterise the international arena. It is clear, as already noted, that the EU has a potentially very large reservoir of ‘resource power’, which it can mobilise to greater or lesser degrees to shape its international milieu. In this context, it must also be noted that the EU has substantial capacities in the form of ‘relational power’. The EU is one of the world’s most accomplished ‘interactors’, whether this is through processes of negotiation or other forms of exchange, and has made a prime point in its collective international activity of developing formal structures through a wide range of agreements with other actors, whether these are national or regional. As Chris Hill and I noted, however, this desire for system and structure is at odds with the considerable fluidity of international politics in the twenty-first century. Relational power is thus potentially a two-edged sword for the EU, carrying with it the promise of predictability and structure and the danger of rigidity in the face of pervasive international turbulence. Alongside resource and relational power, the EU is also a repository of structural power: as a wide-ranging and well-established
institutional actor, with a dominating presence in major regions or areas of international activity, it is capably of structuring its environment almost accidentally, as well as through explicit design. The realities of EU structural power are most apparent in situations where ‘outsiders’ are seeking membership of the Union, and where adjustment of policies to European institutional and normative ‘standards’ can take place despite considerable political costs for those involved, but they are not absent in the broader international arena.

(iv) Questions of Role
The three components of the EU’s international relations outlined above exist in a form of ‘dynamic tension’ with each other. As can fairly readily be seen, the demands of ‘EU as subsystem’ can either complement or conflict with the demands of ‘EU and process’ and of ‘EU as power’. Where the three components reinforce each other, then it might be hypothesised that there is a strong chance of EU collective action and influence; where they are in conflict with each other, then it might equally be hypothesised that the chances of effective EU collective action are low. This central set of forces and tensions has implications at a number of levels, since it forms the foundation for the EU’s collective capacity to pay attention to international issues, to coordinate international activities and to frame a consistent version of what might be described as a ‘European identity’.

One way of taking these general ideas further is to focus on the ways in which the EU generates and sustains a variety of international roles. The literature on roles in international relations has a long heritage, but only recently has it been revisited in the light of experience with ‘European foreign policy’ (Aggestam 2004, 2006; Elgström and Smith 2006: Introduction and Conclusion). In relation to the EU’s international relations, there is considerable value in thinking about such concepts as role conceptions, role articulation, role institutionalisation, role performance, role impact and role evaluation, since these provide a means of making explicit the relationship between (often tacit) assumptions held by EU policy-makers and the way they are played out in the international arena. Not only this, but ideas of role help in the analysis of the tangled relationship between the EU and the use of power
in the international arena (see above); it can be seen that an important element in the ambiguities attending the EU’s orientation towards power is a set of powerful but often unstated conceptions of role and appropriateness. Ideas of role thus offer a potential bridge between those who emphasise the logic of consequences and of material power in ‘European foreign policy’ and those who emphasise the non-material elements of normative power.

But the emphasis on role, in common with the emphasis on central components of the EU’s international relations outlined earlier, does not resolve the existential ambiguities and tensions that surround ‘European foreign policy’. There is a set of unresolved contradictions between the self-conceptions of the EU as a ‘civilian power’ or a ‘normative power’ and the more material impact of institutional power and structural power that we have already described. The complex relationship between the EU as highly institutionalised subsystem, the EU as self-conscious contributor to international processes and the EU as material and ideational ‘power’ thus demands further investigation, and one way of focusing this investigation is through ideas of international order.

III. The European Union and International Order

The literature on international order has very distant historical roots, and reflects the contested nature of the discipline of international relations more generally. This is not the place for a detailed rehearsal of this literature, but it is important for the purposes of this paper to develop a working definition of what is understood by international order. Two dimensions can be identified:

- First, the components of any given international order. Robert Cox (1986; see also Smith 1993, 2000) provides a definition based on three central components: the distribution of material capabilities, the characteristics of institutions, and the nature of prevailing ideas. From this it is apparent that order is not merely a neutral construct: it reflects patterns of dominance and submission, and one key question to ask about any order is that of ownership: whose order are we talking about, and in what configuration does it exist? It is also apparent that we should discuss not simply order in general, but the prevailing order at
any given time (or of course, the prevailing disorder if the three central components are fragile or contested or both).

Second, the ways in which order comes into being or changes. Oran Young has distinguished between three types of order: spontaneous, imposed and negotiated. Each of these types springs from a specific type of ‘founding process’; each has its own characteristic modes of maintenance and relates in distinctive ways to processes of change or decay (Young ?????; see also Smith 2000). From this it is apparent that not every order needs to reflect dominant formations of power, institutions or ideas: it is possible for order to arise out of the almost unconscious balancing of interests, resources and ideas, just as it is possible for orders to be designed and explicitly negotiated or renegotiated.

The combination of these two sets of ideas enables us to produce at least a working definition of international order. For the purposes of the argument that follows, international order is conceived as founded on the material distribution of capabilities, the pattern of institutions and the prevailing ideas to be found in any given international system or subsystem, as mediated by processes of foundation, maintenance and change that may be spontaneous, imposed or negotiated in character. It is with this definition in mind, as well as an awareness of the ambiguities and tensions attending the international relations of the EU, that we can now approach the relationship between the EU and international order. We do so by focusing on three manifestations of the problem: the nature of the ‘EU order’, the EU in the European order, and the EU and global order. Whilst the focus is on the current situation, earlier illustrations will be used as appropriate.

(i) The European Union as an International Order
The earlier discussion of the EU as a subsystem of international relations contained within it the seeds of a discussion of the EU as an international order. It is clear that this order can be analysed in a number of ways (for example, in terms of ideas about ‘security communities’ or regional systems).
Here the focus is on the key characteristics of the order and on the ways in which it reflects the ideas outlined above.

One salient and highly significant characteristic of the EU as an international order in the current period is that the scope of the order has radically changed when compared with the period before the end of the Cold War. In the first place, the order has widened considerably, in two ways. On the one hand, the geopolitical space occupied by the order is greater now than it has ever been, whilst on the other hand, the functional space occupied by the order is also greatly increased. Secondly, the order has deepened, in the sense that its institutional reach has extended, and that its capacity to extract and distribute resources has been enhanced (although this is by no means a uniform process as has already been noted). Finally, the order has not only been widened and deepened but also hardened. Two manifestations of this hardening process can be pointed out here. First, because of the development of security institutions and security practices at all levels in the EU, there is a far harder ‘shell’ to the EU than there has been at any previous time, and this relates to the ‘politics of inclusion and exclusion’ in the EU in new ways (Smith 1996). Second, because of the much more specific development of a European security and defence policy, the external action of the EU has at least in principle acquired a much harder (or as some put it, more martial) edge (Manners 2006). These three linked issues, of widening, deepening and hardening, are clearly a matter of concern and debate within the EU, but they also connect with the relations between the EU as a subsystem and the international arena more broadly defined.

Within the ‘EU international order’, there is a strong role for power and preferences, rooted in the material distribution of resources and capabilities. Discussion of these issues is sharpened and focused by the processes of widening, deepening and hardening noted above, and also by the fact that the distribution of capabilities within the EU as a subsystem is linked to broader considerations. As the EU has grown, so the linkages between Member States and outside regions have become more diverse; so also have the preferences of Member States, rendering the achievement of collective action more demanding. Growth of membership has produced not only the possibility but also the reality of fragmentation, especially in areas where the stakes are
high and the risks are growing. Thus the likelihood of alignments, alliances and coalitions, whether of the reluctant or of the willing, has grown. To take only two examples, the fragmentation experienced over the Iraq war and the development of the EU3 as a ‘vanguard group’ in relation to Iran have revealed the growing complexity of the picture.

The role of material capabilities and of preferences has clearly changed in the ‘EU international order’ since the end of the Cold War. So too has the role of institutions. There has been a clear shift away from a situation in which the order was dominated for the purposes of international relations by the Member States to one in which there is a strong set of framing institutions. Those institutions do not ‘capture’ by any means all of the international relations of the Member States, but they have a powerful shaping influence upon them (M.E. Smith 2003, etc). However, the growth of institutions in the ‘EU international order’ has created tensions and disputes. There are problems of legitimation, especially where the possibility of increasingly ‘hard’ defence policy actions is admitted; for countries with a wide variety of traditions in the democratic control of decisions to use force, the dangers in development of a distant EU security culture and institutions are clear (Lord 2005, JEPP Special Issue 2006). There is also a heightened possibility of inter-institutional competition as the stakes are raised, and as the need for coordination of security policy across ‘pillars’ in the EU architecture grows. This in turn links to the problems of ‘multi-institutional’ coordination in the European order and beyond (see below).

The role of ideas in the ‘EU international order’ has been the subject of a great deal of attention since the end of the Cold War. This attention has focused quite largely on the extent to which ideational factors contribute to the development of a ‘European identity’, and because of this it has important implications for our study of order. In particular, two dimensions stand out. First, there is the way in which social learning and the sharing of an idea of Europe contribute to the cementing of the ‘EU international order’; strongly linked with this is the way in which the generation of a European identity demands the creation of one or more ‘others’ within the broader international arena. Second, there is the more instrumental issue of the ways in which the ‘EU international order’ can generate ‘reigning ideas’ as part of the cement for
the order itself (whether those ideas are consensual or negotiated, or the product of a dominant power within the order). There is relatively little evidence of the growth of a deeply rooted ‘EU identity’ as a cement for the ‘EU international order’ although opinion polls do consistently show majorities for a more united and active ‘European foreign policy’ in most Member States. More worryingly, perhaps, there is evidence in the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty and other recent events that the system does not seem to be generating ‘reigning ideas’ that can contribute to the forward momentum of the ‘EU international order’.

One specific aspect of these issues should be made explicit here. It can be argued that given the uncertainties and ambiguities of the ‘EU international order’ there is a potentially strong role for the EU’s engagement with broader issues of European or global order to become a form of ‘cement’ for the European project more generally. It has been argued by Michael E Smith (2003) and others that the progressive institutionalisation of the CFSP during the 1980s and 1990s was in many ways for internal purposes. More recently it has been argued that in the wake of the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty, the CFSP could be used as the ‘antidote’ for the stalling of the internal integration process (Gnesotto 2005). So the pursuit of broader international order-related objectives can be seen as functional for the ‘EU international order’. But is this enough to compensate for the problems of what might be considered a ‘stalled’ EU order? And if it is not, what might be the implications of that stalling for the EU’s broader European and international engagement? We shall return to that question, but must now move on to consider the EU’s role in the European order.

(ii) The European Union and the European Order

The European integration project was the product of a very distinctive moment in European order, and for most of its life it has been pervasively affected by its implantation into that order. During the Cold War, the European order had a most distinctive set of features arising from the distribution of material capabilities, the consolidation of institutions and the presence of strong reigning ideas (Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 2000: chapter 22). In a way, this made the material order quite stable (if not rigid) but also militated against the
development of a Europe-wide normative order (although the Helsinki Process in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as operating to that end) After the Cold War, the position of the EU in the order has changed radically, and this has major implications for its broader international relations.

The first, and perhaps the most fundamental, of these implications is that the scope of the ‘EU international order’ has become much more closely aligned with the scope of the European order more generally understood. As the *Economist* put it in the course of the 2004 enlargement, the EU was ‘the club that swallowed a continent’. As a result, the Union has internalised very large parts of the contemporary European order, and as a corollary has to develop means of managing its relations with those left outside. This process of internalisation has of course put major strains on the cohesiveness of the ‘EU international order’ as noted above, and has created issues about capabilities, institutions and ideas at that level. The *Economist* headline also carried another set of meanings, though: for a large part of its existence, the EC and then the EU could function as a club, defining itself as an exclusive grouping within a broader continental framework (and of course the framework of the Cold War). This had certain effects on the way institutions and ideas were developed within the club, generating a ‘politics of exclusion’. The move to a ‘politics of inclusion’ is not absolute, of course, and in fact it has developed new exclusions (see below) which now have to be managed. But it means that the ‘EU international order’ is now almost consubstantial with the European order for many purposes, and this has knock-on effects both on the internal workings of the EU and on the Union’s relations with ‘significant others’ ranging from the USA to Moldova.

Whether or not the EU will ever ingest the whole of the European order, it is now undoubtedly a major feature of the distribution of capabilities within that order. The Union is the dominant concentration of resource power and relational power within the order, and its choices about how to structure its relations with other members of the order matter (Keukeleire 2003, 2004). At one level, and as noted earlier, the EU has a great deal of structural power, which can force others to comply with its priorities, especially but not only if they are seeking entry to the Union. This form of ‘forced adaptation’ on the part of European countries might seem to imply the existence of an imposed
order, albeit accompanied by highly sophisticated negotiation processes (Smith 2000). Here, we must be aware not only of the political and diplomatic resources of the EU, but also of its market power, which dominates the ‘new Europe’ and has changed the terms of trade; it is no accident in this context that energy in this new Europe has become a key element and that the EU has become a key focus of attempts to deal with energy insecurity, for the distribution of capabilities and resources in that area is in tension with market power and other aspects of the broader power structure. For the EU, so long embedded in an apparently rigid Cold War European order, the problem has changed from that of coping with a ‘protected but powerless’ status to that of coping with the fact that for many purposes the Union is the European order, and is likely to become more rather than less so. This means that (to use the concepts coined by Arnold Wolfers long ago) the Union has had to adapt to a position where what were milieu goals (to do with the amelioration of the environment within which the EU found itself) have in many cases become possession goals (to do with what one is or what one has) (Wolfers 1962; see also K.E.Smith 2003, 2005). And as was noted earlier, the very fact of widening of the ‘EU international order’ makes a consensus on such matters more difficult to achieve, and thus the tension between material and normative components of order more severe.

This same ambiguity extends to an understanding of the ways in which EU institutions now contribute to the maintenance of European order. As has already been noted, one feature of the EU’s impact on processes of international relations has been and is its two-fold tendency on the one hand to seek ‘institutional isomorphism’ with partners both in Europe and more globally, and on the other hand to institutionalise its partnerships and through this to differentiate between different types or intensities of relationships. So the EU’s institutional reach is not confined to ‘internal’ institutional development, and indeed it contributes to what has been termed ‘external governance’ within the European order and beyond (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The question inevitably arises, to what ends or for whose benefits are the institutional assets of the EU deployed in the changing European order, especially given their achievement of a form of (qualified) institutional hegemony, which has both material and normative forms? To take
only one example, the relationships between the EU and NATO as institutional forces within the European order have entered a phase of complex interaction in which it is not impossible that the EU will emerge as the only game in town even in the area of hard security. Given that the multi-institutional nature of the European security environment has been one of the key features of the post-Cold War European order, this is clearly a significant development (Webber 2006 forthcoming).

If it is accepted that the EU plays a key institutional role in the evolution of the European order, then we have to ask what the impact of the EU’s (in)activity might be. We have seen that the internal institutional development of the EU can have consequences for the European order (and that the internal and the external are strongly linked, most prominently in the case of enlargement). Managing the interaction between these two levels of order-generation has thus assumed an increasingly prominent place in the EU’s ‘European policy’. Most obviously, the construction of an elaborate system of neighbourhood policies, focused on the management of relations around the new EU ‘security perimeter’ has been designed to stabilise the immediate boundary areas in the wake of the 2004 enlargement (Dannreuther 2003; K.E.Smith 2005). But stabilisation is not the only consequence of this process. Alongside processes of stabilisation may go processes of ‘refrigeration’ in which political or economic changes are frozen through the dominance of the stability imperative, or processes of destabilisation as the implications of new inclusions and exclusions are felt (the situations in the Ukraine and Belorussia provide different versions of these effects). Whatever the short or long term consequences, the restructuring effects of the EU’s efforts to institutionalise stability in a still changing Europe are of the first importance. Additional point is added to this conclusion by the fact that (for the first time in forty years) it is at least conceivable to talk in terms of an ‘end to enlargement’ for the EU (Smith 2005 Zagreb paper). Such an ending of what has been a central process in the changing European order would constitute a sea-change in the ways that order is conceptualised and managed.

These arguments relate closely to the role of ideas in the changing European order. The EU’s presence in that order has always been symbolic not only of material assets and institutional strength but also of norms,
identities and understandings that at least in principle can be exported to the wider continent. We have already noted that the partial closing of the ‘export market’ might have very material effects, but this is also important in these non-material areas of impact. The EU has waxed strong in the post-Cold War European order at least in part because of the ways in which it has been taken as symbolising desirable values of democratisation, ‘civilised’ discourse and the (social) market economy. These values have been inscribed not only in policy practices but also in institutional devices such as the various forms of conditionality that have characterised EU policy (K.E. Smith 2003, 2004, 2005). The EU’s role as norm exporter has thus been crucial to the creation of new ‘reigning ideas’ in the European order. In part, of course, this has reflected more material assets such as the capacity to offer the prospect of accession, and this process is still highly visible in the Balkans and elsewhere. What the effect will be of the closing of the ‘enlargement window’ if that happens within the next decade is thus an important question not only for analysis but also for policy.

In examining the role of ideas in the EU’s relationship to the European order, we are thus brought flat up against major questions about the relationship and potential interactions between power and values. If the EU gains traction within the European order primarily because of its dominant presence and structural power, reinforced by its institutional strength, does that mean that the image of the EU as a normative power needs to be qualified and/or reassessed? The original conceptualisation of normative power relied upon the force of example and of emulation as much as on anything else: the EU was/is powerful because of what it is as much as what it does (Manners 2002). But the focus on recent, current and prospective developments in the European order alerts us to the growing linkage between normative and material power: can it be that normative power Europe will adopt coercive means with which to spread its truth? If this is the case, then some uncomfortable questions arise about the fate of ‘civilising powers’ and their ways of contributing both to European and to global order (Manners 2006). Normative power with a hard edge might well be one of the ways in which the ‘hardening’ of the EU international order noted earlier would take external expression.
The upshot of this discussion is to expose a series of tensions and ambiguities in the EU’s relationship to European order. On the one side, the EU can be seen as potential or actual hegemon, benefiting from structural power and increasingly prone to pursuing ‘normative power with a hard edge’ as a key element in its European strategies (and this is a vision that at least some Member States evidently find attractive as a prospect for turbulent times ahead). On the other hand, we can see the EU as increasingly having to address the issues that arise from the ‘swallowing of the continent’ – a process that has both internal and external ramifications, and which imposes heavy demands on the EU’s assets, whether these are material capabilities, institutions or ideas. The problem of ‘organising European space’ (Jönsson et al 2003??) in both the material and the normative sense is thus here to stay for the expanded EU, and feeds back into the ‘EU international order’ described earlier.

(iii) The European Union and Global Order
It is clear from even the briefest survey of EU external policy developments that the Union has a real and expanding engagement with issues of global order. Indeed, one of the key areas of development in the literature on ‘European foreign policy’ during the past decade has been the analysis of the EU’s role in the generation, the maintenance and the adaptation of global institutions and practices, by reference (for example) to the concepts of ‘civilian power’ and ‘normative power’ or to the issues surrounding multilateralism as an international principle or practice (see for a small selection Jørgensen 2006, Laatikainen and K.E. Smith 2006 and the JEPP Special Issue of 2006). Here, our concern is to analyse and evaluate the EU’s relationship to global order by deploying the framework already used to discuss the ‘EU international order’ and the European order.

A first point to make is that just as the ‘EU international order’ has widened, deepened and hardened during the past decade and especially since the late 1990s, and the EU’s relationship to European order has become more intimate and consequential, so has the Union’s engagement with global order. Indeed, in some areas especially of global political economy, the EU has assumed a leading role in the development of global
institutions and the mobilisation of ‘soft power’ (Smith 2005 Granada paper). The Union is more widely engaged, it is more inclined to take a prominent role, and it is clear that the self-image or role conception of those making policies in the EU’s name is more inclined to identify global dimensions to the EU’s international activity. Nor is this simply a matter of commercial policy and related areas: increasingly the EU has entered into domains such as those of non-proliferation or of the global arms trade where the political and security content is self-evident, and others such as human rights where politicisation and securitisation are facts of global life. The scope and comprehensiveness of the EU’s engagement with global order are thus predominant features of ‘European foreign policy’ in the twenty-first century. But this expanding engagement carries with it costs and risks that may cause us to pause in evaluating its fruitfulness or impact.

The power (or powers) exercised by the EU in its growing engagement with global order has historically been identified with ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ modes of conduct. This has not prevented the EU from exercising important ‘state powers’ in the global political economy, or from using its economic and commercial assets to offer rewards or threaten penalties to those with whom it is dealing. What is new in the new millennium is the way in which the exercise of ‘state powers’ by the EU has extended into the global security order. The Union has framed a security strategy which is global in its reach and intended impact, and which is augmented with more specialised statements of intent on specific issues such as weapons of mass destruction. As noted earlier, it has also hardened in significant ways the resources and mechanisms through which it attempts to pursue or to contribute to global security order. If ones uses the aged analogy of the ‘escalation ladder’, the EU has moved steadily up the scale of engagement with security issues during the past five to ten years: conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention – all have taken their place in the EU’s wish-list, although not all have been practised with equal consistency or effect. The EU is thus, it might be argued, increasingly in a position where it can hope to affect the distribution of material capabilities in the global order and thus contribute to the shaping or re-shaping of that order. But there are clearly very important qualifications to this picture: the constraints of the ‘EU international order’ and
of the EU’s primary concern with European order are the most obvious. There is also a constraint in the sense of values and practices. The EU can be conceptualised as a ‘trading state’ in the global arena, reflecting both the advantages and the limitations of that status, and this is likely to play into both the self-conceptions of EU leaders and the perceptions of others they encounter in the global arena. The power of a ‘trading state’ is moderated by internal priorities, by a commitment to multilateralism and by an unwillingness or inability to mobilise ‘hard power’ for international collective action (Rosecrance 1986, 1993; Smith 2004). At present, this seems accurately to describe the EU’s status and role in global order, but that of course does not mean that there are no tensions created by the hardening of the ‘EU international order’ or the acceptance of new power tendencies in the European order.

This discussion extends naturally into consideration of the institutional dimension. We have seen that in the ‘EU international order’ there is a key role for institutions and for institutional change and development, and that this is true also of the EU’s role(s) in the European order. When it comes to the global arena, a number of trends and tendencies become clear. First, the expanded EU is a substantial presence as a regional and highly institutionalised order, and there is purchase to be gained by the EU through exercise of its institutional ‘weight’ (this links to discussion in earlier periods of the ways in which the ‘EU model’ might be exportable at the institutional level). As already noted, the EU can shape the institutional development of other regional orders by providing a series of incentives and sanctions under the more or less formal banner of conditionality. In a related fashion, the Union can shape the development of multilateral institutions, by exercising the leverage provided by its status as a key coalition of states as well as by using the legitimacy conferred by long-standing participation in global regimes. In some global or multilateral institutions, the EU is a potentially dominant participant by sheer weight of numbers: for example, in the OECD, nineteen of the thirty-one member states are members of the EU. The EU is thus heavily implicated and deeply embedded in the global multilateral institutions from which it also gains significant benefits, and EU policy-makers are keenly aware of this fact.
Notwithstanding this deep involvement with institutions at the global level, and the EU’s actual or potential influence within them, the EU’s role is beset with ambiguities. At the most general level, it is not always clear how far the EU is a signed-up member of the multilateralist club (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005; Jørgensen 2006) or how far it can make its role as a global cosmopolitan influence effective (K.E. Smith 2006). Linked with this are the ways in which the intersection of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ pressures on EU policy-makers creates dilemmas and affects the capacity to act in accordance with publicly stated principles. To put it crudely, the imperatives of ‘trading statehood’ and the search for commercial advantage can stand in the way of institutional commitments and multilateral objectives, even though over the longer term they may be not only compatible but also mutually reinforcing. There is still, that is to say, uncertainty over whether the EU is a net producer or a net consumer of global governance, and over the terms of its contributions to global order through multilateral institutions. The extension of the EU’s global concerns into what has become known as ‘security governance’ only serves to sharpen these contradictions. If a broad or comprehensive definition of security is adopted, it is clear that the EU is heavily involved with the pursuit of security in the global arena; but because of the Union’s ‘civilian power’ heritage and the demands of ‘trading statehood’, the Union’s capacity or will to pursue global security needs when the going gets rough is still at issue. This is clearly an issue connected with power, as previously noted; but it is also deeply linked with the institutional features of post-Cold War global order and thus with the EU’s commitment to those institutions.

It was noted earlier that a focus on the ways in which international orders are maintained can shed light on the ways in which the EU pursues and contributes to them. Whereas at the level of the ‘EU international order’ and the European order it is possible to discern strong traces of both imposed and negotiated order, it is very difficult within the global arena to see the EU’s contribution as extending beyond participation in a negotiated order (or a series of negotiated orders). What does this mean for the EU’s role(s) in the establishment and maintenance of global order? Clearly the EU has a major role in the negotiation and renegotiation of key international institutions and
regimes; in some areas it has significant power both over institutions and regimes and within them. But there is a limit to how far words can take you in global politics. Not only this, but a focus on what can be negotiated in the global arena may place severe limits on the ways in which the EU can hope collectively to influence international outcomes. Within the ‘EU international order’ and the European order, we have seen that there are important ways in which the targets of Union influence police themselves into compliance because of the incentives for conformity and the costs of non-compliance. These features are not absent in the global arena, but they are much more difficult to discern and to capitalise upon for EU policy-makers. Another characteristic of the EU’s international negotiation activities has often been said to be a ‘process orientation’ rather than a ‘results orientation’ – a tendency that sits logically within the framework of ‘trading statehood’, but that is not always conducive to effective response in the face of international crisis and turbulence. The picture is again one of contradictions and ambiguities, and the point is that these emerge precisely from what the EU is in a fundamental sense.

With this in mind, it is instructive to ask whether the EU collectively has any developed notion of world order, and whether it is capable of contributing to the ideational dimension of international order as defined earlier in the paper. As I have noted elsewhere (Smith 2004) it is possible to extrapolate from the notion of ‘trading statehood’ a particular approach to world order that encompasses multilateralism, negotiation and the propagation of norms typical of ‘civilian power’. This in turn can be juxtaposed with an American conception of world order that, whilst it might not arise directly out of what can be called ‘warrior statehood’, has a strong emphasis on unilateralism, coercion and the imposition of norms associated with a particular conception of democracy. It seems clear in current conditions that neither the EU model nor the US model is universally accepted, and that neither has conclusively proved itself capable of handling the challenges of the new world (dis)order. The argument in this paper suggests that whilst it is possible analytically – and indeed rhetorically - to distinguish between these two archetypes of world order orientation, the reality is much more untidy. Whilst the EU remains essentially a civilian/normative power in world order terms, the hardening of
the ‘EU international order’ and its near-total encompassing of the European order have lent it a new and (for some) disturbing edge, which logic suggests will have an effects on the Union’s orientation towards world order issues. For its part, the USA since the election of 2004 has shown signs of a greater recognition of multilateral imperatives and a softening of its warrior stance, but this does not necessarily or fundamentally change its orientation towards world order.

IV. Conclusion. The EU and International Order - A Study in Contradictions?
This paper has attempted a systematic evaluation of the EU’s relationship to questions of international order. Starting with a discussion of the several ‘faces’ to the international relations and roles of the Union, it then moved on to try and establish the ways in which these might influence the EU’s approach to international order at three levels: the ‘EU international order’, the European order, and the global order. The aim has been not only to explore these three levels of EU engagement, but also to identify the ways in which they interact or come into collision. By doing so, the paper has aimed to uncover a number of underlying problems in ‘European foreign policy’ and to link them to broader questions of international order as identified in the international relations literature.

The paper has a number of conclusions:

➢ First, the ‘EU international order’, conceptualised as emerging from a subsystem of international relations more generally, demonstrates characteristic issues in relation to the distribution of material power, the role of institutions and the role of ideas. Strong tendencies towards the widening, deepening and hardening of the ‘EU international order’ can be discerned, but these have led to strains and contradictions. In current circumstances, it is relevant to ask whether the ‘stalling’ of the ‘EU international order’ is likely to lead to problems of introspection and to the ‘externalising’ of problems encountered within the order, with implications for outsiders and especially for those most closely linked to the EU by geopolitical or geo-economic ties.
Second, the EU has greatly increased its role within the European order, to the extent that it is not entirely fanciful to see it as encompassing that order. This has important implications for the three key components of international order – power, institutions and ideas – and for the maintenance of European order in particular. One key consequence of this development is that many of the broader problems of European order may become ‘internalised’ into the ‘EU international order, placing heavy demands on its institutional and ideational ‘cement’. Another implication is that the EU wields or represents major structural power within the European order, and that this has profound effects in shaping members of the order whether or not they are actually members of the EU itself (Friis and Murphy JCMS; JEPP Special Issue on External Governance).

Third, the EU represents a distinctive approach to global order, and this is important in an era where there is no or very little consensus on the essential features of that order. The argument that the EU is essentially a ‘trading state’ with an orientation towards multilateralism and the exercise of ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ power is persuasive, but must be qualified by reference to the changes in the ‘EU international order’ noted above. The hardening of the ‘EU international order’ especially has created the possibility of actions in parts of the register that were not available before, albeit with severe limitations and constraints. The EU thus confronts a global arena in which there are more opportunities, but also more risks and ‘contingent liabilities’ emerging from its halting progress towards a ‘real’ foreign policy. At the same time, it confronts issues arising from uncertainties in US conceptions of global order, which have an immediate and profound effect on the attitudes and commitments of EU Member States.

In these circumstances, what might be the future relationship(s) between the EU and international order? There is likely to be continuing ambiguity and a problem with the management of the ‘EU international order’ in a changing world. Nothing new there, it might be said, but this will pose severe problems of internal and external management when the increasingly close alignment
between the ‘EU international order’ and the European order is taken into account. In turn, this will create interactions with global order and with ‘significant others’ in that order, especially the USA, which will call into question the EU’s capacity to contribute to order at the global or the multilateral level. The paper began by questioning the assumption that ‘international order is good for the EU and the EU is good for international order’. By dissecting the key terms of this assertion, and by drawing attention to the ways in which power, institutions and ideas feed into and upon concepts of order, the paper may have helped us to identify the analytical and policy implications of the EU’s current international position. In particular, it makes us think about what constellations of international order are good for the EU, what qualities of the EU enable it to contribute positively to international order, and how it might do so.

REFERENCES


